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Introduction
A specter haunts not only Europe but 
the world: that of compositionism. All 
the Powers of the Modernist World have 
entered into a holy alliance to exorcise 
this specter! (Latour, 2010a: 474)
Empiricist Interventions: 
Strategy and Tactics on the Ontopolitical 
Battlefi eld
Anders Kristian Munk and Sebastian Abrahamsson
Recent papers by prominent scholars in science and technology studies (notably John 
Law and Bruno Latour) have crystallized a fundamental disagreement about the scope 
and purpose of intervention in actor-network theory or what we here choose to bracket 
as empirical philosophy. While the precept of agnostic description is taken as a given, 
the desired eff ects of such descriptions are highly debated: Is the goal to interfere with 
the singularity of the real through the enactment of multiple and possibly confl icting 
ontologies? Or is it (also) to craft new and comprehensive common worlds supported 
by notions of due process and parliamentary procedure? In this paper we think about 
this disagreement as a question of research strategy (a normative discord about the 
desirable outcome of an intervention) in order to assess its implications for research 
tactics (a descriptive accord about the practical crafting of an adequate account). A 
key point here is to challenge the impermeability of such a division and show how 
the strategic dispute, if to be taken seriously, invariably spills over to swamp the level 
of tactics. To illustrate this point, we draw upon materials from our recent doctoral 
research projects and to facilitate the discussion we make two deliberate caricatures: 
Firstly, we operate with a simplifi ed history of actor-network theory in which a 
strategy of epistemological critique has been replaced by two contending agendas 
for ontological intervention. Secondly, we address these two contending agendas as 
distinct options which map on to the positions of our two main interlocutors. In doing 
so, it becomes possible to compare their respective tactical implications as we work 
through two examples of what might constitute an empiricist intervention.
Keywords: intervention, empirical philosophy, compositionism
If we become constitutionalists we’re 
losing location and specifi city. We’re 
losing contingency. We’re adopting a 
particular political or legal mode of 
thinking about what it is to live well 
together. (…) And fi nally we’re forget-
ting that rules and procedures do not 
actually rule: that in practice the world 
is irredeemably messy. (Law, 2009: 5)
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Th e claim that analysis should be treated 
as a form of intervention is by now well 
rehearsed within the strand of STS some-
times branded as empirical philosophy1. 
Th us, authors like John Law and Anne-
marie Mol have argued that methods 
work by performing realities rather than 
by reporting on them (e.g. Mol, 1999; Law, 
2004a) and Bruno Latour has repeatedly 
stressed that good accounts rely on trans-
formation rather than information (e.g. 
Latour, 1999; 2004a; 2004c). 
While this line of reasoning has been 
both provoked and enriched by a wave 
of feminist and post colonial critique of 
‘naïve’ description and its tendency to priv-
ilege the already powerful while silencing 
the already marginal (e.g. Haraway, 1988; 
Star, 1991; Lee & Brown, 1994), empirical 
philosophy has increasingly been think-
ing through its burgeoning commitment 
to politics on its own terms. Th e past two 
decades2 have not only seen the idea of 
analysis as intervention gain prominence, 
they have also witnessed a fecund debate 
take shape around the means and virtues 
by which such interventions might be suc-
cessfully carried out. 
Before going any further it seems impor-
tant to assert that the concept of interven-
tion does not have to connote an action-
oriented or participatory agenda, even 
though this is often the case. As Jessica 
Mesman points out in her account of a 
researching self positively dedicated to the 
engagement with, and transformation of, 
professional practice, ‘research eff ectively 
intervenes [regardless of our intentions] 
by accepting, challenging or diversifying 
problem defi nitions of the actors we study’ 
(Mesman, 2007: 281). Th is is a particularly 
relevant notion in the context of empirical 
philosophy where the issue of intervention 
is cast in terms of description: what do to 
with it/expect from it and how to handle 
the various forms of politics and resistance 
confronting it (see especially Vikkelsø, 
2007). 
Our focus in this paper thus renders the 
concept of intervention in a very specifi c 
format which is not necessarily amenable 
to all aspects of the wider and somewhat 
more action-oriented debates on the topic 
which are currently taking place within 
STS (for an overview see for example Zui-
derent-Jerak & Jensen, 2007; or Cohen & 
Galusky, 2010). Put crudely, to empirical 
philosophy the main concern with inter-
vention seems to be how to make research 
relevant to practitioners while simultane-
ously insisting on an agnostically descrip-
tive position which could easily be con-
strued as being somewhat on (if not way 
out over) the sideline of the events in which 
the said practitioners are caught up. At 
least two strategic alternatives are emerg-
ing in response to this concern. 
Lining up the Armies: Two 
Strategies for Intervention
With his ‘compositionist manifesto’, Bruno 
Latour (2010a) has resuscitated the grand 
narrative style and called for us to engage 
in ‘cosmopolitics’: the meticulous work 
of crafting a comprehensive common 
world (Latour, 2004d; following Stengers, 
2003a; 2003b); of ‘reassembling’ instead of 
debunking (Latour, 2005b). Th is quest not 
only requires careful attention to ‘matters 
of concern’ rather than hasty allusions to 
‘matters of fact’ (Latour, 2003), but also 
new versions of parliamentary essentials 
such as due process and constitutional 
order (Latour, 2004b).
John Law, on the other hand, has explic-
itly abstained from pledging any norma-
tive or procedural allegiances, what he 
with a polemic stroke calls ‘constitution-
alism’ (Law, 2009)3, insisting instead that 
STS should rely on its attention to the mul-
tiplicity of situated experience and focus 
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on the diff erence it can make by describ-
ing/enacting these messy specifi cities (e.g. 
Mol, 2002; Moser, 2008). Although immune 
to any talk of parliaments and common 
worlds, this approach is still engaged in 
politics through its commitment to undo-
ing the singularity of the real. Rather than 
due process and careful assemblage the 
keyword here is ‘interference’ (Law, 2004b; 
2009; following Haraway, 1989; 1991).
Arguably, then, there is a (somewhat 
caricatured) choice to be made for the 
empiricist scholar keen to treat analysis 
as intervention: unite under the compo-
sitionist banner, or join the guerrilla of 
ontological interference4. In this paper we 
unpack that choice by drawing upon two 
recent fi eld experiences: one is concerned 
with the mummifi ed body of an Egyptian 
boy and the converging visual practices 
of art and science (Abrahamsson, 2010a); 
the other with the illusive phenomenon of 
fl ood risk and an unfolding public knowl-
edge controversy in the UK (Munk, 2010). 
One played out in historical archives, a 
museum, radiological wards and an art 
gallery; the other in the offi  ces of fl ood 
modelling consultancies and insurance 
companies. 
Th eir obvious diff erences aside, they 
were both wrestling with a commitment to 
empirical philosophy and fl agged up some 
of the practical implications of trying to 
make a strategic choice between compo-
sition and interference. In retrospect they 
raise questions about the kind of inter-
ventions we might hope to make and the 
relationship between such hopes and the 
more mundane choices that mark up the 
daily pace of a doctoral research project: 
choices about how and where to ask what 
kind of questions, and choices about what 
to do with the materials these questions 
generate. Surely, faced with the option of 
crafting commonality or enacting dispar-
ity, a choice must somehow be made. What 
we want to discuss here, however, is the 
tactical arsenal available to support either 
of these strategic alternatives, let alone 
deciding between them.
Th e military lingo is deliberate. It is 
intended as a way of recasting the partition 
between normative questions regarding 
interventionist ambitions and methodo-
logical questions regarding the practicali-
ties of description. As such the battlefi eld 
refers broadly to the ontopolitics of any 
eff ort (research related or not) struggling 
to defi ne what is at stake in a given issue 
and should not be read specifi cally as a 
metaphor for the intellectual debate tak-
ing place between the main interlocu-
tors of this paper (Law and Latour)5. By 
referring to our daily research practices 
as ‘tactics’ and the interventionist pro-
grammes under consideration as ‘strate-
gies’ we are simply reminding ourselves 
of a diff erence between ‘the theory of the 
use of military forces in combats’ and ‘the 
theory of the use of combats for the object 
of the war’ (Clausewitz, 2008: 89). We are 
in other words trying to make a distinc-
tion between the received wisdom on 
how to conduct research in the tradition 
of empirical philosophy, and the shifting 
motivations for doing so in the fi rst place. 
At the same time we are also interested in 
the practical impossibility of such a dis-
tinction, noting that if ‘Strategy forms the 
plan of the War (...) it follows, as a matter 
of course, that Strategy must go with the 
Army to the fi eld in order to arrange par-
ticulars’ (Clausewitz, 2008: 147). 
However dissimilar in scope, the stra-
tegic alternatives of compositionism and 
ontological interference have both been 
fashioned from the same core fi bre of 
ideas: their respective protagonists cite 
the annals of actor-network theory (before 
and after) extensively in support of their 
diff ering ambitions (compare for exam-
ple Latour, 2005b: 258-262 with Law, 2009) 
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and thus rely on much of the same weap-
onry, and many of the same manoeuvres, 
for carrying out their operations. Working 
through our examples, we will take this 
shared tactical arsenal into account in 
order to become attentive to the ways in 
which it supports, complicates, or possibly 
obstructs the contending plans for the war 
eff ort. We want to do that by inspecting 
three basic tenets of what we consider to be 
empiricist research tactics.
Battlefi eld Awareness: What 
kind of Questions to Ask?
Th e fi rst of these tenets has to do with the 
operational theatre in which empirical 
philosophy sees combat (intervenes, that 
is) and our attention to the challenges it 
poses. We could call it battlefi eld aware-
ness. Taking Annemarie Mol’s defi nition 
of ‘ontological politics’ as a useful starting 
point, it is a theatre in which ‘the condi-
tions of possibility are not given’ and hence 
a theatre in which ‘reality does not precede 
the mundane practices in which we inter-
act with it’ (Mol, 1999: 75). Th at goes for 
our research practices as well and inevita-
bly fosters the claim that description can 
be treated as a form of intervention, what 
John Law calls ‘our own unavoidable com-
plicity in reality making’ (Law, 2004a: 154). 
Consequently, we are taught to nurture 
a basic uncertainty about what there is in 
the world and to ask questions which do 
not enforce particular conditions of possi-
bility on whatever it is we are studying.
Isabelle Stengers compares this situa-
tion to that of the solitary huntsman who 
cannot rely on a pack of hounds to chase a 
targetable prey out into the open. Rather, 
he must take it upon himself to develop 
such a target in the interplay between his 
own subtlety and that of his prey. It is not 
simply a matter of taking aim and pull-
ing the trigger, because the prey is never 
‘visible, panic-stricken, reduced to the 
channelled behaviour imposed on it by 
the pack’ (Stengers, 1997: 129). On the 
contrary, if the prey appears visible and 
panic-stricken we are cautioned not to 
shoot off hand but to question instead how 
it has been made so. In practice that means 
not only that the laborious task of tracing 
associations through their specifi c locales 
should always have priority (this is gener-
ally agreed upon, compare for example 
Law, 2004a with Latour, 2005b), but that 
the questions we ask play a role in defi n-
ing the kind of skirmishes we come to 
engage – what Doreen Massey refers to as 
the active process of ‘imagining the fi eld’ 
(Massey, 2003) – and thus sets us on track 
down potentially very diff erent interven-
tionist avenues. In our respective eff orts 
to become attentive to the battlefi elds in 
which we were about to intervene we felt 
logically compelled to ask open-ended 
questions, but as it turned out there were 
several ways of doing this, each of them 
off ering their own strategic opportunities.
Our fi rst example concerns the issue of 
inland fl ood risk in England and Wales, 
and in particular the provision of fl ood 
insurance. Th is is a highly controversial 
issue and has for the past decade been a 
matter of sustained public concern. Th is is 
not least due to the complex and changing 
makeup of a problem rooted in the tran-
sitive domain between science, politics, 
and the market; a problem ranging from 
weather phenomena to planning policies; 
and a problem riddled with the inherent 
uncertainties involved in trying to handle 
(i.e. simulate, estimate, price, trade, pre-
vent, mitigate) events which have yet to 
take place. Th e evolving plethora of possi-
ble future fl oods circulating both the mar-
ket place and the broader public domain 
under the auspices of hydraulic and 
fi nancial models has considerable ‘practi-
cal consequences’ (James, 1987: 506) and 
Anders Kristian Munk and Sebastian Abrahamsson
Science Studies 1/2012
56
makes just as much of a diff erence to the 
insurance market as do actual fl oods when 
they occur. But while it is of paramount 
importance to both homeowners, insur-
ance companies and government agen-
cies to know their fl ood risk, there seems 
to be no clear guide as to how this should 
be known and hence the unsettlement is 
pungent.
One way of mustering some ontological 
curiosity about this relationship between 
risk and controversy would be to question 
whether the lack of consensus simply con-
cerns various ways of knowing the risk of 
fl ooding, or whether this variety of knowl-
edge practices also implies a proliferation 
of diff erent versions of fl ood risk itself. 
Understanding how fl ood risk becomes an 
object of controversy would, if this is the 
case, mean that we should ask how fl ood 
risk becomes several objects in the fi rst 
place – how it becomes a ‘coexistence of 
multiple entities that go by the same name’ 
(Mol, 2002: 151) – and how the protagonists 
of the issue are thus no longer concerned 
with exactly the same thing.
Th at kind of curiosity allows the notion 
of controversy some potency by setting it 
fi rmly apart from mere disagreements and 
rectifi able misunderstandings. It also plays 
to the strategic imperative of ontological 
interference by promising to enact a mul-
tiplicity of realities which might not lend 
themselves in an equally ready manner to 
the formal politics of risk management. In 
a public discourse bent on reaching set-
tlement through the procurement of clear 
and unambiguous information, the contri-
bution of such an enquiry could actually 
be to bolster controversy and embrace it 
as a healthy expression of a world which is 
after all ‘irredeemably messy’ (Law, 2009: 
5).
However, while such a project could 
probably be approved by the commanding 
offi  cers of John Law’s ontological guerrilla 
there is no guarantee that it would appeal 
to the compositionist commissary. If the 
aspiration is not only to ‘[multiply] the enti-
ties with which we are led to live’, but also 
to ‘[decide] whether the assembled aggre-
gates form a liveable world or not’ (Latour, 
2005b: 254), then it might require a diff er-
ent kind of curiosity to begin with.
Th e diff erence, it seems, lies not with the 
interest in multiplicity (that interest is con-
served), but with the interest in normativ-
ity: the task of crafting a properly compre-
hensive common world can of course only 
be undertaken if the list of constituents to 
be comprised is already exhaustive (mul-
tiplicity), but it must also fi nd ways of dis-
tinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ constitutions 
(normativity). Some sense of cosmopoliti-
cal correctness is in other words needed to 
enact commonality in what could other-
wise be taken (mistaken, perhaps) for irre-
deemable messiness.  So, instead of asking 
what fl ood risk is (keeping open the condi-
tions of possibility for a potentially multi-
ple object), we might consider asking what 
it takes to be risking a fl ood (keeping open 
the conditions of possibility for a particu-
lar kind of assemblage and its heterogene-
ous constituency).
Th e promise of such an enquiry is not 
so much to enact multiple versions of what 
fl ood risk can be, as it is to explore what 
makes for well constructed fl ood risk and 
thus determine what it should be (in a 
cosmopolitically correct sense). We will 
explore some of the possible results of such 
an investigation later on, but for now it suf-
fi ces to note that there are at least two dis-
tinct lines of enquiry to decide between.
Our second example concerns a mum-
mifi ed body from ancient Egypt. During 
the summer of 2008 it was on loan from 
a museum in the UK and exhibited in an 
art gallery in London. In that art gallery a 
range of other materials were on display 
next to it: sculptures made from CT-scans 
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of the mummifi ed remains; a documen-
tary fi lm about the sculpting artist’s jour-
ney to the original burial place in Egypt; 
documents detailing a forensic analysis 
of the body; a booklet in which a museum 
curator had written about it; etc. Rather 
than reporting a single version of the main 
exhibit, or supplementing what science 
had already done to it, these materials con-
jured several contrasting, sometimes con-
tradictory versions of what seemed to be 
one and the same thing, namely the mum-
mifi ed body itself.
In a similar manner to fl ood risk, albeit 
with very diff erent implications, that body 
was enacted as ‘many things and one’ (Mol, 
2002: 82): it had been made to witness 
about its past under the gaze of forensic, 
archaeological and medical science; it had 
been exhibited in museums as a material 
embodiment that shed light on a long gone 
civilization; its afterlife was part and parcel 
of the Egyptomania sweeping over Europe 
since the beginning of the 20th century. 
Tracing these complex histories might be 
considered a task for interventionist social 
science6 – or, indeed, for interventionist 
exhibition practice – one possible outcome 
of which could be to foreground the ‘elusive, 
ephemeral, and unpredictable’ (Law & 
Urry, 2004: 404) aspects of a body which is 
otherwise rendered as being in every way 
tangible, lasting and long since predicted. 
Th is kind of unravelling, then, would be 
specifi cally pitched against a predominant 
and singular ontology with which it would 
deliberately, as the main interventionist 
goal, attempt to interfere.
Again, there is another possible, 
and potentially quite diff erent, way of 
approaching this enquiry. Contrary to 
the risk of fl ooding, a mummifi ed body is 
precisely – and virtually by defi nition – a 
well-constructed and enduring object. 
What the Egyptians knew so well was that 
in order for the deceased to subsist, despite 
the gnawing teeth of time, he or she had 
to be prepared, embalmed, encapsulated 
in layers of wrappings and laid to rest in 
a still environment. In other words: for 
a body to become a mummifi ed body it 
had to be carefully and properly made. An 
alternative way to proceed would be to ask 
how – considering the diverging orderings 
mentioned above – the body manages to 
subsist as ‘one’? How does it hold together, 
how does it endure, how does it come to 
appear as singular?
Mummifi ed bodies, like art and museum 
exhibitions, monuments or archives, are 
ways of organizing time and space in such 
a way that they appear as dead, immobile 
and still (Sloterdijk, 2009: 71-72): they are 
capsules of stability and order that humans 
invent ‘to hold onto a world that always 
overwhelms their grasp’ (Rose, 2002: 461, 
compare with Whitehead, 1926: 166 on 
Cleopatra’s Needle). Th e mummifi ed body 
was specifi cally designed to obstruct any 
attempt to unravel, deconstruct or multiply 
it. After all, unravelling the body, if we take 
this in a literal sense, would mean the end 
of it, as evidenced by the many (in)famous 
unrolling spectacles of mummies in the 
19th century (Taylor, 1995). 
In a new and comprehensive common 
world, to what role might such stabilities 
be assigned? Contemplating a somewhat 
similar exhibition (about the evolution of 
the science of the evolution of the horse) 
Latour notes that in order to ‘convince the 
people to invest in the devising, upkeep 
and enlargement of the very humble 
means necessary to know something with 
objectivity’ (Latour, 2007: 31) we need 
not only histories of knowledge, but also 
histories of what is being known. Perhaps, 
with a compositionist aspiration in mind, 
this is a more fruitful way to question 
what goes on in the art gallery: what, if we 
approach an enduring object with which 
we have to live together well, should an 
Anders Kristian Munk and Sebastian Abrahamsson
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exhibition of a mummifi ed body try to 
accomplish?
Contemplating both the exhibition of 
the mummy and the issue of fl ood risk it is 
possible to imagine several lines of enquiry 
which would all meet the challenges of an 
ontopolitical battlefi eld. However, each 
of them seems to promise diff erent kinds 
of interventions, which suggests that it is 
not suffi  cient to approach an issue like the 
solitary huntsman approaches his latent 
prey, asking non-prescriptive questions, 
keeping open the conditions of possibility. 
Although this is still a core tactic we have 
to ask ourselves the additional question of 
exactly what kind of possibilities it is that 
we are trying so hard not to condition. Is 
it the multiplicity of objects like fl ood risk 
or mummies or is it their cosmopoliti-
cally correct constitutions we are keeping 
an open mind about? Th is refl ection plays 
directly into the current strategic discord 
between the ontological guerrilla and the 
compositionist international since decid-
ing what it is we are trying not to condition 
will have strategic consequences for the 
kind of interventions we can hope to carry 
out.
Marksmanship: Where to Go 
and What to Describe?
Th is leads us to the second tenet which 
has to do with the investigative techniques 
that we bring to bear on our emerging 
targets once the operational conditions 
have been acknowledged. We could call it 
marksmanship. It is frequently summed 
up in the simple maxim that we should be 
rigorously descriptive and it can be readily 
justifi ed in battlefi eld awareness: to leave 
the conditions of possibility open implies a 
rejection of explanatory frameworks, what 
John Law calls ‘the prescription to be non-
prescriptive’ (Law, 2009: 6; following Callon, 
1986), and requires us instead to ‘follow 
the actors themselves’ (Latour, 2005b: 12) 
in order to fi nd the ‘uniquely adequate 
account of a given situation’ (Latour, 2005b: 
144).
Yet, if we acknowledge that a choice of 
interventionist strategy is already signalled 
in the questions we choose to ask, if we 
acknowledge that we cannot simply leave 
the conditions of possibility open but that 
we must to some extent be strategically 
refl exive as to what it is we are keeping them 
open for, then there could be consequences 
for our subsequent descriptions as well. 
Now that there are several possible and 
strategically diff erent lines of enquiry 
available to us, the interesting question for 
this paper becomes how they infl uence 
our decisions about where to go and what 
to describe. What we want to argue here is 
that our choice of questions calibrates the 
descriptive work and the tactical doctrines 
informing it in very particular ways.
Let us start with the mummy this time 
since it represents a challenge of its own 
to this kind of descriptive marksman-
ship. Contrary to the brawling controversy 
about fl ood insurance it seems mute and, 
well, dead. How do you describe some-
thing which appears to have stopped hap-
pening? Arriving at this late stage when the 
exhibition has been assembled, the mum-
mifi ed body scanned and analysed by 
the forensic team, the body loaned by the 
museum, we may ask ourselves how this 
specifi c mummy, unearthed in Egypt more 
than 200 years ago, ended up right here, in 
an art gallery in London, and right now, in 
the summer of 2008?
A fi rst option would be to trace actors 
in the past through archival material and 
textual references. Indeed, a lot of the asso-
ciated material that is exhibited in the gal-
lery pave the way for an intervention that 
could be construed as genealogical and 
archival, probing how, through diff erent 
practices and in diff erent situations, this 
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body has been shaped and enacted diff er-
ently. If, for a moment, we ignore that mute 
and dead ‘body itself’ and focus on those 
absent presences, this is what could hap-
pen: in the gallery space there are textual 
references to Flinders Petrie, the archae-
ologist who brought the mummy from the 
excavation site in Hawara in 1888; there 
are also the CT-scans, dated 2006 from a 
hospital in Oxford, that tell of the forensic 
analysis of the body; there are texts written 
by a museum curator about the historical 
specifi city of the excavation; fi nally there is 
documentary material by the artist.
Seen through the lens of what we here 
call the ontological guerrilla the list of 
potential actors to follow proliferate: 
there are radiologists in the hospital that 
scanned the body; there is an archaeologi-
cal excavation, and a historical record to 
analyze; there is a museum to visit, and 
a curator to interview; there is an artist 
and some documentary footage to engage 
with. And once we endeavour to do all of 
the above the list of possible leads expand 
further: the curator mentions an X-ray 
analysis of the body in the 1960’s, and an 
archive where the X-ray plates are kept; 
engaging with the radiologists, it turns out, 
will require some familiarity with medical 
scanning and the particular confi gura-
tion of vision that it implies; the historical 
record, and the specifi cities of the excava-
tion site, will undoubtedly be messy and 
involve all sorts of detours.
Following this line of enquiry we might 
end up with many diff erent situated enact-
ments of the mummifi ed body, each of 
them crafted in local and specifi c practices 
that operate more or less in isolation from 
one another. Along the way the radiolo-
gists that we interview will tell us that, for 
them, using a medical diagnostic tool, the 
body is transformed from a ‘dry and dusty 
package’ into a ‘virtual model that can be 
navigated, copied and transported’. Mean-
while, the museum curators will tell us 
that they knew ‘virtually nothing about the 
mummy before the scan, except it comes 
from a village in Egypt called Hawara’. We 
will also learn that in spite of the momen-
tary stir that the current exhibition has 
caused in local media, the archaeologist 
who is responsible for having brought the 
body to the UK did not show a lot of inter-
est in this particular body, as evidenced 
by his excavation report (Petrie, 1889). In 
each of these sites and situations diff er-
ent versions of the body are made to exist. 
Pursuing this route we will have ended up 
with an account of diff erent enactments of 
a particular bundle of bones and wrapping 
that we call the body: diff erent entities that 
go by the same name.
In the above, what happens is that we 
show how the mummifi ed body coexists 
with others and that the reality of such a 
body is to some degree multiple. In this 
enterprise, however, the body is literally 
left untouched. Rather, focus is on the 
ongoingness of practices and practition-
ers. But how does the ‘body itself’ fi gure in 
all of this? In the art gallery people come 
and go – surely – other bodies, those of the 
visitors, move around slowly and silently, 
looking at the objects on display; pointed 
lights illuminate the space in particular 
ways; fl ickering screens present visitors 
with images of Egypt on the one hand and 
moving CT-images from the radiological 
examination of the mummy on the other 
hand; meanwhile the buzzing noise from 
the street outside is kept at bay and the 
vibrant fl ow of the city is suspended. In 
this sense, the art gallery is a space not 
unlike the Egyptian tomb chambers: ‘they 
too were designed to eliminate awareness 
of the outside world’ and they too ‘were 
chambers where an illusion of eternal 
presence was to be protected from the fl ow 
of time’ (O’Doherty, 1986: 8).
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If we were to resist momentarily the urge 
to ‘unravel’ the mummifi ed body and trace 
out its associations, this is what we are 
left with: a tomb-like exhibition, a ‘deeply 
unrealistic’ space in which ‘the usual con-
straints of time, space, and realism are 
suspended’ (Weibel & Latour, 2007: 94). 
Compared with the highly controversial 
landscape of fl ood risk, there is very little 
happening in this exhibition space. On the 
other hand, considering the messy pasts 
of the body, the tranquillity is striking and 
cannot have been achieved without work. 
Perhaps an alternative could be to articu-
late the stillness haunting the mummifi ed 
body and describe this lack of things hap-
pening as a feat of its own?
Instead of using the art gallery merely 
as a convenient and stimulating point of 
departure which presents us with various 
clues to other and at fi rst glance more lively 
construction sites we could also take aim 
directly at the mutability of the body in 
front of us and the quiet spectacle which 
permits it to subsist alongside artefacts 
telling a more heterogeneous story. For 
the compositionist it might be more fruit-
ful to pursue such an enquiry, venturing 
into the stillness and seemingly eternal 
presence of the exhibit. How is such still-
ness achieved? What could be learned 
from it with regards to the co-existence of 
vibrant and lively visitors on the one hand 
and mute, dead and stilled bodies on the 
other (see also Abrahamsson, 2010b)? Th e 
mummifi ed body is neither an emergent 
‘fact’ nor a controversy that has been set-
tled. Rather, it is a bundle of organic matter 
that has been temporarily – or rather tem-
porally – slowed down. As such, not only 
does it off er the empirical philosopher an 
intriguing and challenging contrast with 
the fast paced life of the city outside, or the 
intricate movements of visitors and staff  in 
the gallery; it also conjures some interest-
ing frictions vis-à-vis our other example.
By contrast, consider two ways in which 
one could try to craft a uniquely adequate 
account of fl ood risk. One option is to 
follow the daily practice of some of the 
experts who are frequently called upon by 
both the insurance industry and the Envi-
ronment Agency (which is the responsible 
government body in the UK) to map out 
the extent and frequency of various hypo-
thetical fl ood events. Th is is in many ways 
similar to following the multiple enact-
ments of the mummifi ed body except the 
practices which are now in the cross hairs 
tend to be spatially rather than temporally 
distributed: the work is both ongoing and 
frequently disputed.
One might for example try to follow 
the daily doings of fl ood modellers and 
describe how the English city and land-
scape is transformed into topographic 
images using remotely sensed data from 
satellites and airborne LiDAR (Light 
Detection and Ranging); how these images 
are modifi ed to accommodate a simulated 
‘natural’ fl ow of water across a virtual 
landscape by digitally weeding out pen-
etrable or impermanent barriers such as 
cars, sheep, bridges or vegetation; or how 
these modifi ed images (called Digital Ter-
rain Models) are then divided into grid 
cells and fed into a piece of software capa-
ble of computing how water will fl ow from 
one cell to the next. Th is process, known as 
2-dimensional hydraulic modelling, is typ-
ically used to simulate surface water fl ood-
ing from rainfall runoff , a problem which 
has become increasingly costly to the 
insurance industry during the past decade 
(see also Munk, 2012). 
Such a description is clearly calibrated 
by a desire to fi nd out how fl ood risk is 
brought into being (it sets its sights on the 
construction of the object) and could very 
well support a strategy of interference 
since 2-dimentional hydraulic modelling 
is by no means the only practice with a 
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stake in the production of fl ood risk. Alter-
natives include loss modelling (the transla-
tion of fl ood depths into fi nancial impacts), 
catastrophe modelling (the translation of 
large, modelled event sets into aggregate 
probabilities of for example bankrupting 
an insurance company), or 1-dimensional 
hydraulic modelling (the translation of 
surveyed topographic data into a simu-
lated fl ow of water in a river channel and 
an estimation of its potential overfl ows 
into an adjacent fl ood plain), not to men-
tion the vernacular realisations of fl ood 
risk resulting, for example, from a home-
owner’s corporeal apprehensions amid 
clammy fl oorboards, lost property and dis-
rupted routines.
To argue that these diff erences are not 
merely a matter of changing perspectives 
but of diff ering realisations of fl ood risk 
itself requires an attention to the specifi -
cities of their enactment. Th e objects con-
structed in 2-dimensional modelling could 
be described as the networked eff ects of 
things like hydrodynamic equations, sat-
ellites and graphic processing units; their 
sturdiness relies  on the successful nego-
tiation of questions like how to weigh the 
resolution of remote sensed imagery and 
the size of grid cells against the limits of 
computational power, or how to devise the 
guiding principles for the strip down of 
digital landscapes that enable simulated 
water to fl ow ‘naturally’ through them. 
As such, the way in which they are put 
together matters in very particular ways to 
discussions about insurance zoning and 
planning policy.
Crucially, other versions of fl ood risk 
rely on other translations for their eff ects, 
they must negotiate other kinds of ques-
tions for their sturdiness, and hence they 
will be sensitive to other issues, or matter 
to the same ones in diff erent ways. Mak-
ing explicit by way of descriptive marks-
manship how these diff erences are not 
simply contenders for the position as ‘the 
correct representation fl ood risk’, but that 
they constitute distinct formats of real-
ity would in itself be an accomplishment 
for the ontological guerrilla. Th e ques-
tion, though, is what this type of account 
accomplishes if the strategic imperative 
is not per se to produce more mess but to 
craft a more liveable common world? What 
if we were to investigate what it takes to be 
risking a fl ood in a cosmopolitically cor-
rect manner and did not satisfy ourselves 
with an account of how diff erent versions 
of fl ood risk are brought about?
Take some inspiration from the ver-
bal meaning of risk: besides referring to 
some sort of object, it is also a way of doing 
things. Perhaps it is worth exploring what 
makes that particular ‘regime of enun-
ciation’ (Latour, 2010b) diff erent from, 
say, knowing something for a fact (Latour 
& Woolgar, 1986), believing in it (Latour, 
2005a) or rendering it as law (Latour, 
2010c). A point here would be that risk can-
not really exist as a tangible object like the 
ones described above (fl ood maps, prob-
abilities, projected losses) and still be risky 
in and of itself. Th e presence of risk, Joost 
van Loon has argued, is ‘always necessar-
ily deferred’; it is ‘a potential coming‐into‐
being, a becoming‐real’ (van Loon, 2002: 
54).
Th e insurance industry, which is in the 
business of trading these potentials, pro-
vides an excellent laboratory for testing 
such a claim. Following a series of severe 
fl ood events between October and Decem-
ber 2000, several primary insurers repeat-
edly threatened to stop quoting in areas 
where fl oods had, to their minds, ‘become 
inevitable’ (as one informant put it). Too 
much uncertainty kills off  the gamble, but 
so does too much certainty. In an attempt 
to reintroduce a vital element of fortuity the 
Association of British Insurers set up the so 
called Statement of Principles under which 
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government and local authorities commit-
ted to certain protection levels in return for 
a guarantee that homeowners could have 
their policies reinstated. Th e prospect of 
fl ooding could once again be shrouded in 
the right amount of uncertainty. While it is 
no doubt possible to describe how diff erent 
knowledge practices bring diff erent claims 
about fl ood risk into existence, such an 
enquiry does not account for the dynamics 
that keep these realisations from solidify-
ing to a point where their presence is no 
longer deferred.
What is starting to emerge in both 
examples is a progressive expansion of the 
descriptive scope. Whereas the ontologi-
cal guerrilla have to supply descriptions of 
multiple enactments of what appears to be 
one and the same thing in order to claim 
some sort adequacy vis-à-vis its strate-
gic imperative, compositionism must add 
another layer in order to achieve some-
thing similarly suffi  cient. To be precise, 
it is the defi nition of a uniquely adequate 
account which must adapt and relate to the 
choice of strategy in order to have any real 
implication. 
It is worth remembering here that 
while descriptive marksmanship is a long 
standing empiricist research tactic (see 
for example Latour and Woolgar’s intro-
duction to their anthropology of science, 
1986: 27-33) it has not always formed part 
of an explicitly interventionist project. On 
the contrary, it was by proxy of descrip-
tive accounts of the daily doings of sci-
ence and technology (e.g. Callon, 1980; 
1986; Latour, 1987; 1988) that a later focus 
on ontology developed. Th is early work 
took place under the tutelage of a diff erent 
and now outmoded strategic imperative to 
which the purpose of description was nei-
ther to enact ontological multiplicity, nor 
to account for the heterogeneous constitu-
ency of a new and better common world, 
but to challenge the idea of a pre-existing 
realm of objects and a correspondence-
based theory of truth. Th ere has in other 
words been a change in strategy, a change 
which is aptly signalled in this sixteen year 
old passage by Annemarie Mol and Jessica 
Mesman:
Go and unravel the construction of 
an object. Any object! It doesn’t mat-
ter what. Th e laws of gravity, a nuclear 
power plant or the HIV virus - anything 
will do. Just show that the thing doesn’t 
exist by itself, but depends on some-
thing else. Which is true. But why repeat 
it? Th e only reason for doing so seems to 
be to undermine epistemology. Again. 
And again. And yet again. (Mol & Mes-
man, 1996: 423)
Although the question is no longer whether 
or not something is constructed – a question 
which in Latour’s mind has become 
‘irrelevant’ (since long time settled: it always 
is) and replaced by the crucial question 
of whether or not something is ‘well or 
badly constructed’ (Latour, 2010a: 474) – a 
core part of empiricist marksmanship still 
consists in descriptively unravelling the 
construction of objects7. 
In the hands of the ontological guerrilla 
this tactic has in a fairly straightforward 
manner been elaborated so that it covers 
ontological multiplicity, enabling its 
resulting accounts to be deemed adequate 
vis-à-vis a strategy of interference when 
they enact such multiplicities. Of course, 
if the dominant strategic imperative was 
still to ‘undermine epistemology’ (Mol & 
Mesman, 1996: 423) we could have focused 
our energy entirely on a practice like 
2-dimensional hydraulic modelling (in the 
case of fl ood risk) or forensic analysis using 
CT-scans (in the case of mummifi ed bodies), 
and we could have assured ourselves that 
our manoeuvres had strategic relevance 
before we ever got around to accounting 
63
for alternative realisations. Compared to 
that, a strategy of ontological interference 
is already demanding an expansion of the 
descriptive scope: accounting for how an 
object is constructed is no longer adequate 
by default; its reality must also be multiplied. 
In compositionist hands, however, 
further tactical elaboration seems to be 
needed in two important and perhaps not 
equally straightforward ways. Firstly, it can 
no longer be assumed that the goal alone is 
to unravel constructs (even if this leads to 
a multiplication of the real). Th is is clear 
in the case of fl ood risk where the enact-
ment of things that carry that label can 
only partially account for the way in which 
fl oods are risked: an adequate account 
would have to be calibrated by the broader 
event in which these constructs can be 
maintained somewhere in between solid 
objectivity and its antipode (prevented, 
in a sense, from becoming facts). Besides 
the Statement of Principles and the way in 
which it hardwires planning policy guide-
lines and spending reviews into the politi-
cal ecology of fl ood insurance, such an 
account might for example also include the 
way in which actual fl ood events unfold in 
new and surprising ways and the continu-
ous reconfi gurations of the issue that result 
from this constant suspension of certainty. 
It is also clear in the case of the mummi-
fi ed body where the description would be 
calibrated by the silent event unfolding in 
the art gallery, instead of being restricted 
to diff erent constructions of the body as 
an object of a set of temporally distributed 
knowledge practices.
Secondly, even though the descriptive 
scope is thus expanded, there is still the 
question of cosmopolitical correctness 
which needs to be addressed if the idea of 
adequacy is to have any real currency in 
the compositionist camp. Once a descrip-
tion has been crafted, once the heteroge-
neous constituency has been listed, we 
have to ask ourselves if, or to what extent, 
this contributes to a more livable common 
world? How do we do that? Descriptive 
marksmanship will not help us here; we 
need some kind of normative protocol by 
which to proceed. Th is takes us to the last 
of the tactical tenets which has to do with 
the way we handle descriptive accounts 
(what we do with them; how we talk about 
them) once they have been brought about.
Target Recognition: What to 
do with Descriptions?
Th e third tactical tenet is less clearly 
defi ned and is not really an explicit part 
of the received wisdom on how to con-
duct ourselves as empirical philosophers. 
Indeed, ‘tenet’ might be the wrong word 
for it altogether.
Nevertheless, it can be seen as our 
attempt to put a name to a de facto recur-
rence in empiricist research practice, a 
recurrence which in spite of its ambigu-
ity seems more and more crucial to the 
strategic face-off  we engage in this paper. 
We could call it target recognition, and it 
has to do with the afterlife of the uniquely 
adequate account; the way we frame it; 
the operations it performs. In his review 
of Latour’s now famous ethnography of a 
pedological fi eld trip to the Boa Vista forest 
(Latour, 1999), Michael Lynch wondered 
what would have been lost if the otherwise 
clear account of the way in which a group 
of scientists manage to reduce the cacoph-
ony of a rainforest into a scientifi c state-
ment had been left without the addition of 
‘abstract models of referential ‘elements’ 
arranged in chains’ (Lynch, 2001: 230)? 
Denoted is a latent confl ict with the pledge 
to keep open the conditions of possibility. 
Such abstractions (and the circulating ref-
erence diagram is a powerful example of 
that) easily come to serve as ‘useful’ guide-
lines for subsequent descriptions of other 
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practices. What we want to argue here is 
that while this practice of subsuming spe-
cifi cities under more abstract headlines 
has its problems – especially to the onto-
logical guerrilla – there are also ways in 
which interventionist research – and espe-
cially compositionism – cannot do without 
it.
Latour, for instance, does not only pro-
vide descriptions, he also orders whatever 
he is describing under more abstract head-
ings like ‘modes of existence’ (e.g. Latour, 
1999: 157; 2007) or ‘regimes of enunciation’ 
(Latour, 2005b: 241n, 2005a); and Law does 
not only attend to messy specifi cities but 
discerns in them diff erent ‘modes of order-
ing’ (Law, 1994) or diff erent ‘modes of mat-
tering’ (Law, 2004b). It is not diffi  cult to see 
the potential problem, recalling for exam-
ple that under no circumstances should 
a ‘practice be defi ned as ‘like any other’’ 
(Stengers, 2005: 184), but at the same time 
these abstractions play key roles in both of 
the interventionist strategies under con-
sideration in this paper. To the composi-
tionists they provide the normative stand-
ards for distinguishing particular types of 
constructions as being more or less suc-
cessfully carried out; to the ontological 
rebels they facilitate the idea that there 
is more than one way of being politically 
relevant. How does that relate to our two 
examples?
Th e latter fi rst: to make the claim that 
what goes on in the art gallery is a form 
of ‘interference’ (according to John Law 
(2004b) a mode of mattering distinguish-
able from, say, ‘critique’ or ‘puzzle-solv-
ing’) seems to play an important role in 
the collective formulation and articulation 
of a specifi c strategy for intervention. Th e 
abstraction helps us recognize a similar-
ity in purpose across a wide spectrum of 
accounts crafted to the unique particulari-
ties of what would appear to be very diff er-
ent situations. Th us, an account that mul-
tiplies the reality of a controversial object 
like fl ood risk can be likened to, and com-
pared with, an account of the way a mum-
mifi ed body is exhibited alongside devices 
of its disparate enactments. Th e only rea-
son why these two examples can be made 
to speak to one another in a discussion 
about the practical pronunciation of dif-
ferent interventionist strategies is that an 
abstract model – in this case a particular 
mode of mattering – has been logged in our 
targeting systems. Suddenly, similarity can 
be acknowledged in specifi cities.
Th en the former: to think about the role 
of some describable practice for the greater 
good of a not yet realized collective is not 
easily done without some level of abstrac-
tion. Latour tells us, for example, that 
while the contribution of scientists will be 
to ‘give perplexity the formidable asset of 
instruments and laboratories, which will 
allow it to detect scarcely visible phenom-
ena very early’ (Latour, 2004b: 137), the 
contribution of moralists will be to remind 
the rest of us ‘that the collective is always 
a dangerous artifi ce’ (Latour, 2004b: 157); 
that our task is to help religion, politics, 
science and economics to ‘sing again in 
their right respective keys’ (Latour, 2010b: 
607); and that we should neither forget that 
there is a diff erence, for example, between 
existing as a living horse (‘subsistence’) 
and a specimen in the hands of evolution-
ary scientists (‘reference’), nor that there 
are many more possible ‘modes of exist-
ence’ (Latour, 2007: 24). Th us, while the 
mummifi ed body is no doubt a specimen 
of various sciences, and its existence con-
ditioned on various chains of reference, it 
is also a dead object which subsists (even 
though it might do so in a radically diff er-
ent way than the horse struggling to sur-
vive). Equally, while fl ood risk represents 
a multiplicity of scientifi c phenomena with 
diff erent referential ‘blood fl ows’ (Latour, 
1999: 80), it could also be argued that ‘risk’ 
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interference sharply against each other 
and although it is not the fi rst to do so (see 
especially Law, 2009) the picture is more 
complicated than that. Bruno Latour is 
still preoccupied with the enactment of 
multiplicity – indeed, that is in many ways 
what good cosmopolitics is supposed to 
do (e.g. Latour, 2004d) – although he feels 
the need to devise a framework, a new and 
comprehensive common world with due 
process and a constitutional order to sup-
port it. And while John Law proclaims that 
‘rules and procedures do not actually rule’ 
and that ‘in practice the world is irredeem-
ably messy’ (Law, 2009: 5) he still talks of a 
diversity of political ‘goods’ (‘truth’ being 
one of them, depending on the context) 
and of our responsibility to consider these 
as part of our interventions (Law, 2004a: 
148-151). What we hope to have crystal-
lized by forcing a sharply drawn opposi-
tion on this debate is a fundamental dif-
ference between two prominent visions 
for the future of empirical philosophy in 
STS. Th e point of this exercise has been to 
establish a basis for refl ecting on the con-
sequences these diff ering visions can have 
for the more mundane or tactical choices 
that make up an empiricist intervention.  
We have deliberately tried to suspend 
judgement, painfully aware that no such 
thing is possible in practice. Our ambition 
has been to highlight a friction on the com-
manding level of empiricist STS and relate 
it to some of the practical problems we 
have grappled with when trying to do doc-
toral research within that tradition. In the 
resulting discussion we have argued that 
there are no watertight shutters between 
the descriptive craft of the uniquely ade-
quate account and the various aspirations 
concerning the political eff ect of such 
accounts. Instead we have suggested that 
the relationship bears some similarity to 
that of strategy and tactics: even though 
there is a diff erence between good marks-
should be considered a separate mode of 
existence which diff ers in important ways 
from the referential enunciation of facts.
We seem to be getting to the crux of the 
strategic discord here. While Latour has 
explicitly stated his ambition to des cribe 
and compare regimes of enunciation 
across the spectrum, Law keeps to the 
position that ‘what counts as beauty can 
neither be determined in general, nor out 
of context’ (Law, 2004a). We want to argue 
that this dissonance can be traced to their 
strategic positions and can be taken as a 
sign that they have ‘gone with the army to 
the fi eld to arrange particulars’ (Clause-
witz, 2008: 147). Th e compositionist desire 
to craft a new sense of cosmopolitical cor-
rectness becomes an impossible enter-
prise if we cannot fi nd ways of making our 
descriptions do a more abstract job than 
‘merely’ accounting for specifi cities. We 
might for example want to think about 
the virtues of exhibiting the mummifi ed 
body in both its referential modes and its 
peculiar form of subsistence, or we might 
consider treating the unsettling existence 
of fl ood risk and its symbiotic relationship 
with controversy as something to be cared 
about and valued for its ability to ‘spark a 
public into being’ (Marres, 2005). In either 
case, there is no way around abstractions 
if that enterprise is to be engaged with any 
signifi cance.
Ceasefi re
Th is paper relies on a caricature. In fact, it 
relies on two caricatures. Firstly, it lumps 
30 years of empirical philosophy within 
the fi eld of STS under three crude stra-
tegic agendas: a showdown with episte-
mology succeeded by two diff erent inter-
ventionist imperatives, namely that of 
the ontological guerrilla and that of the 
compositionist international. Secondly, 
it pits compositionism and ontological 
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manship and an overall plan for the war 
eff ort, neither aspect can be very eff ective 
in practice without taking the other fi rmly 
into account. Arguably, there are a number 
of alternative metaphors which fi t that bill, 
but what we fi nd particularly attractive 
about the belligerent spin of strategy and 
tactics is both the notion of an ontopoliti-
cal battlefi eld in which all interventions 
(including those of the empirical philoso-
pher) must abide by the same basic rules, 
as well as the practical recognition that 
a strategic agenda, in order to have any 
impact, must always be fi elded alongside 
the various tactical manoeuvres making 
up a campaign. 
So the ambition was not to take sides 
but to explore what the contending plans 
for interventionist empirical philosophy 
could possibly mean for the local skir-
mishes in which we are engaged. In doing 
so a certain need for strategic refl exivity 
on the level of the empiricist foot soldier 
has become clear. Good questions do not 
simply leave open the conditions of possi-
bility: it must be taken into consideration 
what we are keeping them open for; what 
it is we are trying not to condition. Equally, 
good descriptions do not simply provide 
uniquely adequate accounts: it must also 
be taken into consideration what adequacy 
means vis-a-vis the strategic imperative 
under which we intervene. And fi nally 
we must consider that even the most 
uniquely adequate account may have to be 
abstracted in various ways in order for it to 
become relevant to strategy – even though 
it fundamentally disagrees with some core 
virtues of empiricist research tactics.
While we both agree and disagree with 
points raised by both of our two strate-
gic interlocutors (and while we also agree 
and disagree between each other on these 
points), it is no doubt easier to artifi cially 
suspend judgement in a text like this than it 
is to do so in practice. We have tried to stay 
out of it, and arguably that sits somewhat 
uneasily with the theme of intervention. 
Signe Vikkelsø has convincingly voiced 
the idea that a good description is one 
that ‘puts itself at risk by being exposed to 
a multiple audience, and that at the same 
time is sensitive to the ways it puts others 
at risk’ (Vikkelsø, 2007: 298), and perhaps 
it is fi tting to add if only a tinge of that kind 
of sensitivity before we withdraw. Take the 
example of fl ooding: here it was clearly, 
and sometimes obstructively, felt that 
description is not a neutral activity. On 
the contrary, it matters immensely to the 
stakeholders how the issue is accounted 
for, a fact which becomes clear no matter 
whether one is dealing with government 
agencies, insurance companies, modelling 
consultancies or homeowners which are 
all frequently contesting the way in which 
the others defi ne, perceive and inform the 
problem8. And although the mummifi ed 
body is arguably somewhat less controver-
sial, we both repeatedly experienced that 
the research questions we fi elded became 
matters of concern to the practitioners we 
were engaging with. Indeed, part of the 
motivation for writing this paper stems 
from this shared experience of ongo-
ing redefi nition which forced us to con-
tinuously rethink what we were trying to 
achieve. 
Th us, interventionist tactics could also 
amount to learning to become tactful, 
about becoming attentive to a situation 
as it evolves, and adapting as it does so. It 
could be about care as opposed to choice 
(Mol, 2008), or about putting yourself at risk 
and letting others intervene with what you 
are trying to do (Whatmore, 2003; follow-
ing Stengers, 1997). Here, we have risked at 
least two things: First, we have jeopardized 
our strategic interlocutors in the sense that 
we have forced them to discuss our exam-
ples through two caricatures. Second, we 
have attempted to suspend judgement – 
something we both acknowledge is impos-
sible in practice – and by doing so we have 
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invariably betrayed the ongoingness of our 
projects.  But, we would argue, it is in this 
impossible space of neutrality that diff er-
ences and discords become tangible and 
open for discussion. 
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Notes
1 As one of the reviewers of this paper 
pointed out, our main concern here is 
actually with actor-network theory, and 
not with STS. While we agree with this 
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point, we choose to use the diff erent 
term empirical philosophy – a smaller 
umbrella – to describe our main inter-
locutors. For three illuminating cri-
tiques of the term actor-network theory 
see Gad & Bruun Jensen, 2010; Latour, 
1999a and Mol, 2010.
2 Th ere are probably several ways of dat-
ing this, but we take the publication of 
the edited volume ‘A Sociology of Mon-
sters: Essays on Power, Technology and 
Domination’ (Law, 1991) as a useful 
marker.
3 He thus rhetorically lumps Latour’s 
project with that of Harry Collins and 
Robert Evans (2002; 2007), although he 
recognizes the otherwise very limited 
similarity.
4 We have chosen to narrow down our 
interlocutors to mainly two so as to be 
able to crystallize what we consider 
to be a signifi cant diff erence. Perhaps 
we are then reifying the two positions 
that are under scrutiny without look-
ing at how and where they travel, or 
how they are translated as they do so. 
Our main point, however, is exactly that 
they travel and so inevitably make their 
mark on interventionist research within 
empirical philosophy.
5 While the use of war metaphors in STS 
has been critiqued, and is by now largely 
abandoned, we would argue that it is 
not so much war itself that we are inter-
ested in but rather the ontopolitical dif-
ferences between strategy and tactics in 
any confl ict.
6 In a sense the approach we have taken 
to intervention in this paper makes it 
somewhat meaningless to talk about a 
piece of research which is not by impli-
cation interventionist. What we are 
trying to highlight here, however, are 
not the various ways in which a spe-
cifi c piece of analysis can (or cannot) be 
thought of as an intervention, but the 
various motivations one might have for 
carrying out that analysis in diff erent 
ways. 
7  With this we do not want to suggest that 
the issue of construction is irrelevant 
tout court, but rather that a lot has hap-
pened since the period in time when 
(social) construction was topical. What 
has happened is a shift in the terms 
under which the concept is deployed.
8 Indeed, the doctoral studentship formed 
part of the interdisciplinary RELU-
funded ’Understanding Environmen-
tal Knowledge Controversies’ project 
which comprised an explicitly action-
oriented interventionist agenda under 
which fl ood-stricken local publics were 
engaged through experiments with dif-
ferent ways of doing fl ood science (see 
for example Whatmore, 2009; Lane, 
Landström & Whatmore, 2011; Lane et 
al., 2011)
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